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PART I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to present a case-study of how an Argentine 
steelplant built in 1943 has evolved in the 34 years since then - and to offer an 
interpretation of this evolution as an example of a "first-best" technological 
strategy being applied in an "nth-best" economic context. 
The interest of such a case study is that it can exemplify a theme which is 
of common interest and relevance in many Latin American countries - namely how 
firms owning industrial plants can manage to adapt and evolve their plants in the 
face of a "macroeconomic" context which is full of economic distortions and 
irrationalities. 
Of course, the existence of serious macroeconomic distortions and 
irrationalities in Latin American economies is perfectly well known and nothing 
new, yet there still remains very much that is unknown about the way microeconomic 
agents such as firms respond to such distortions. Patently, there must be some 
ways of responding more successfully than others, and one can therefore ask - what 
might "first-best" technological strategy for firms consist of when the macro-
economic context does not conform to what the text books say it should be? Or to 
put it more succinctly, in the words of an Argentine nuclear engineer - how does 
one succeed in "innovating in the midst of organised chaos"? 1/ 
This problem, of trying to work out a first best technological strategy for 
the firm in response to imperfectly predictable outside circumstances extends not 
just to the classic "choice of technique" decisions faced by firms when installing 
brand new capacity, but also to the much less studied topic of how firms should 
best evolve their installed technology over time. What happens, then, to the 
economics of choice of techniques, of replacement and obsolescence decisions and of 
"evolutionary operation" of plants when factor markets are subject to rationing, 
when capital markets don't always function properly, and when sharp fluctuations of 
the political and institutional horizon are likely to occur yet difficult to 
predict? 
Even to put the question is to see that the answer will not come out of a 
neat model or even a score of neat models - as we are plainly up to our necks here 
in "institutional" factors which will continually mess up the picture with problems 
such as - "but how were they to know that scrap supplies would be rationed in 1967 
or that steel prices would be liberated by the new government?" 
Nevertheless, although neat models are not in sight, there should still be 
some interesting economic conclusions to be drawn by observing how firms have 
actually responded to difficult macroeconomic contexts over longish periods of time. 
It is in this spirit that we now put forward - in Part II of the paper - the 
following case study of the evolution of the Rosario steelplant of Acindar during 
34 years. Although case-studies can never by themselves be conclusive, the study 
does point to a number of specific issues on which the traditional economic 
1/ This aphorism was coined by Jorge A. Sabato, who is well known for his 
participation in the Argentine nuclear energy programme and for his contributions 
to the field of science and technology policy. 
analysis of decisions on steelmaking technology might be improved. These issues 
are discussed in Part III of the paper, which follows after the case-study. 
PART II. THE CASE STUDY 
The case-study that follows is concerned to describe and then explain the 
"paradox" that Acindar - which is a well managed and technologically progressive 
steelmaking enterprise - continues to operate one of its plants - the Rosario 
plant - with long outdated technology. 
In Section 1 of the case study Acindar's record as a technologically and • 
managerially progressive enterprise is traced out. Then in Section 2, the role 
of the- Rosario plant within Acindar's overall steelmaking activities is explained. 
This then equips us to present, in Section 3, the nature of the "paradox" of the 
Rosario plant. Section 4 is then concerned with the "imperfections" in the 
postwar Argentine economic context which can help account for the Rosario paradox 
and thus enable Acindar's technological "strategy" for the Rosario plant to be 
seen as rational in profit-maximising terms. Finally, in Section 5, some 
interesting detailed features of the unconventional, technological strategy 
adopted by Acindar in the Rosario plant are explored and discussed. Section 6 
then sums up the key points of the case-study, thus paving the way for the last 
part of the paper, which offers a series of reflections concerning some of the 
interesting economic issues which emerge from the Rosario plant's experience. 
We now turn to the case-study itself. 
Section 1. Acindar as a progressive enterprise 
Acindar S.A. was started in 1942 and is today Argentina's largest private 
nationally-owned enterprise. 2J Its record shows that the enterprise has 
displayed a consistently dynamic technological and managerial "thrust" right from 
its start in 1942 up until the present day. 
Thus, in 1943 Acindar pioneered by designing, constructing and starting up 
the Rosario steel plant - which is the subject of this study - at a time when all 
the usual technology channels from abroad were cut-off by the war. Then in the 
period 1947-51 Acindar reached right out to the "technological frontier" and 
imported and started up a huge 250,000 tons modern continuous rolling mill in a 
brand new plant, which it built in Villa Constitución, some 50 km from Rosario. 
Since then, Acindar has also pioneered, within Argentina, in forged products for 
the automobile industry during the 1950's; in iron-ore exploration, in special 
steels and in PVC tubes during the 1960's; and in pre-stressed steel bars, in 
high quality forging products, in electrodes, and now in direct reduction 
steelmaking technology during the 1970's. 
2j As measured by sales volume. Only the two state enterprises Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Argentinos and SOMISA, and the multinational firm Fiat appear ahead 
of Acindar in La Prensa Economica's list of "las mas grandes empresas de la Argen-
tina", Editorial Lourdes, Buenos Aires, 1977. 
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Furthermore all three of the steelplants with which Acindar currently 
operates - and the fourth plant now going up - embody highly significant inputs 
of Acindar's own engineering designs and adaptations. 
There can therefore be no doubt about the consistent technological capability 
of the enterprise throughout its entire evolution from 1942 to the present day. 
Turning next to the entrepreneurial and managerial side, Acindar has also 
revealed itself to be consistently dynamic and well run. Both under its first 
president (and founder) Arturo Acevedo, who ran the enterprise from 1942 to 1967, 
and under its second President, Jose Martinez de Hoz (now Argentina's Economy 
Minister), 3/ Acindar was widely acknowledged for its efficiency and 
progressiveness - and in support of this one can note that Acindar was able to 
command a long succession of important loans from international banking 
institutions. 
In short, there is every reason to consider that Acindar conforms very well 
to the economist's model of a "profit-maximising" firm. Furthermore, it is clear 
from both published material and inside knowledge of Acindar that the enterprise's 
strong technical and engineering capability provided its management with a full 
range of "technological strategies" amongst which to choose the most profitable. 
Therefore, in seeing how Acindar has reacted to the difficult macroeconomic 
context of three decades in post war Argentina, we are examining the reactions 
of a well-run, technologically dynamic, and profit-maximising enterprise. 
Section 2. The role of the Rosario plant within Acindar's 
steelmaking activities 
The next indispensable element of "background" needed to understand the 
nature of the "paradox" presented by the Rosario plant is to appreciate how the 
Rosario plant fits into the overall set of Acindar's steelmaking operations. These 
operations are summarised in the flow diagram next page which refers to the year 
1975-76. (NB See footnote below) 4/ 
As can be seen in this diagram, Acindar currently has three working steel 
plants, and one more is under construction. To start with we have the Rosario 
plant, which is the object of this study. This was the enterprise's first plant, 
which started up production in 1943. It is located on one of the principal avenues 
3/ Martinez de Hoz left the Presidency of Acindar in April 1976 to become 
Argentina's economy Minister under the new military government. 
4/ The manuscript of this paper was completed in September 1977, when the 
Rosario plant was still in full production. However, prior to the submission of 
the manuscript we heard that Acindar in November 1977 had finally closed down the 
Rosario plant's Siemens Martin steelmaking units. 
This is a significant event in the context of this case study and we comment 
on it in a special postscript appended to the end of the case-study. 
The reader should therefore understand that the author's use of the present 
tense in this paper refers to the period up until September 1977 when all the 
Rosario plant's units were still functioning. 
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leading into the city of Rosario in the Province of Santa Fe, Argentina, on a 
site which is a few miles inland from the river Parana. 
Diagram 1 - Acindar's SteelmjMiii; Activities 1975-70 (Simplified a/) 
a/ The readers will appreciate that this is a highly simplified representation. For instance, no recycling flows are shown 
and both inputs and outputs have beer, treated in broad categories. A further significant point is that the production capacities 
of the various installations are in most cases considerably greater than is suggested by the production figures shown in the 
diagram. In approximate terms Acindar's installed capacity in 1975-76 consisted of 1) Rosario: Siemens Martin steelmaking 
115,000 t.p.a., Billet mill 160,000 t.p.a., Finishing mill Í20.000 t.p.a.; 5) Marathon: Electric arc steelmaking 160,000 t.pa, 
Continuous casting 200,000 t.p.a.; 3)Acevedo: Morgan 1 360,OOP t.p.a., Morgan 2 380,000 t .p.a., Hire plant 180,000 t.p.a., 
Tube plant 80,000 t.p.a.. 
b/ This plant is now naired the "Fine and Special Steels Plant", following the acquisition of 100% ownership in Marathon by 
Acindsr from 1972 onwards. 
Then we have Acindar's other steel plants which have all been constructed 
in Villa Constitución, on a single large site actually on the banks of the Paraná 
some 50 kilometers downstream from Rosario. Here on this second site are located 
the "Acevedo" rolling plant (which started up in 1951), and which is named after 
the enterprise's founder, and the "Marathon" steelmaking plus forge plant which 
was begun as a small joint venture in 1961 between Acindar and the German Thyssen 
group - but was then completely taken over by Acindar as from 1972 and greatly 
expanded since then. 
Finally, we have the large new "Direct Reduction" plant which is currently 
being built by Acindar right next to these two existing plants. This is due to 
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come "on stream" at the end or 1978, with the objective of largely replacing 
the billets which Acindar has at present to acquire from or via SOMISA, the 
Argentine State steelworks whose plant is only a few kilometers from Villa Cons-
titución further down the river Parana, in San Nicolás. 
It can be appreciated from the diagram that the basic role of the Rosario 
plant within Acindar is to produce a significant fraction of Acindar's overall 
billet requirements. 5/ The secondary role of the plant is to produce a quite 
small proportion of the range of finished rolled products produced by the 
enterprise. 
To see the precise historical contribution of the Rosario plant in these two 
roles - i.e. first as billet producer, and second as producer of finished 
5/ The reader is reminded that these lines were written prior to the Nov. 
1977 closure of the Rosario plant's steelmakmg units. 
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These charts show how the Rosario plant's production contribution within 
Acindar as a whole has evolved since 19h3. The first chart shows how the Rosario 
plant has, ever since 1954, been producing a fraction ranging from 25% to 35% of 
the billets used as raw material in Acindar's finishing mills. Then, with regard 
to the Rosario plant's finishing mill, the second chart shows that since 1956 it 
has rolled less than 25% of Acindar's finished output, and in recent years is 
rolling less than 10% of finished output. 
In recent years, in fact, only a small fraction (some 20%) of the billets 
produced in the Rosario plant have gone on to be processed on the plant's own 
finishing mill. The other 80% of the billets have been sent for processing in 
the Acevedo plant 6/ - so that one can for most purposes analyse the billet 
making role of the Rosario plant separately from the finishing mill role. Our 
principal concern in what follows will be with the Rosario plant in its role as 
billet producer. 
This now completes the basic information about how the Rosario plant fits 
into Acindar's overall steelmaking operations. The next task, which we now take 
up, is to describe why the long continuation of billet production in the Rosario 
plant can be considered as a "paradox". 
Section 3. The paradox of the Rosario plant 
Even the most casual acquaintance with the production technology of the 
Rosario plant reveals that - by modern technological standards - the plant's 
basic process technology is almost a "museum piece". For example, the plant 
itself is 34 years old. It uses Siemens Martin furnaces for steelmaking, a 27 
year-old old primary mill for billet rolling, and its semi-continuous finishing 
mill is of equally antique origins. It can be stated unequivocally that two of 
the plant's three basic technologies (its steelmaking and billet making 
technologies) are clearly "outmoded" in the sense that no entrepreneur putting 
up a new plant would now install them. As for the third basic technology - the 
plant's finishing mill - although this is not "outmoded" at its particular scale 
of production, it is nevertheless not competitive with high speed continuous 
mills producing at larger scales of production. The chart next page compares 
the Rosario plant's three basic technologies with what is generally acknowledged 
to be today's "best-practice" basic process technology. 
6/ The point is that for most of the sizes and production-runs of the 
various products rolled on Acindar's finishing mills - e.g. reinforcing bars, 
sections, wire rod, etc. - it is considerably cheaper to roll these on high speed 
continuous mills, like the two Morgan mills in the Acevedo plant, rather than 
rolling them on low speed "discontinuous" or "open-layout" mills such as the one 
in the Rosario plant. However, the Rosario mill has the "comparative advantage" 
over the modern Morgan mills in t,a) the low speed precision rolling of forging 
bars for the auto-industry, and in (b) the rolling of "filler" items in the 
production programme, which involve very small production runs or which involve 
the use of off grade raw material which may cause expensive production halts on 
the high speed mills. 
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Chart 3. Comparison of the Rosario plant's technology with best-practice technology. 
Process technology used in 






Period when best-practice technology 
began to be adopted commercially in 2/ 
many different countries and clearly 
established its economic superiority-
Siemens-Martin Steelmaking 
(from a cold scrap charge) 
Ingot casting followed by 
rolling to billets 
Slow speed, open layout bar 










Sources: 1/ Author's research in Acindar. 7J On Electric arc steelmaking, see Alan Leckie and Philip Maxwell, Transfers 
of Electric Arc Steelmaking Technology to Latin America, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 1975. On contiguous 
casting, see L. Nabseth and G.F. Ray Eds, The diffusion of new industrial processes, Ch.9, Cambridge University Press 1974. On 
high speed continuous mills, no specific dates could be traced by the author, but these mills were developed and widely adopted 
long before Acindar's first purchase of a continuous mill in 1950. 
This chart gives a good idea of just how "old fashioned" the basic process 
technology of the Rosario plant is. 
Given then that its technology is so outmoded, the thing that economists 
find surprising about the Rosario plant today is - why is this 34 year-old plant 
still running? 
The surprise lies in the fact that as a result of its being based on veteran 
technology the Rosario plant today produces steel billets - its main product - at 
costs estimated recently at 13% above the cost of similar billets produced in 
Acindar's new billet making plant, the "Marathon" plant, in Villa Constitución 7/. 
So the question that immediately springs up is - why has Acindar continued billet 
production at the Rosario plant for so many years on the basis of out of date, high 
cost production technology? Even more specifically one can ask, - why did Acindar 
not adopt any of the following four alternative courses of action which would strike 
almost any steel technologist or economist as having been clearly superior to 
prolonging billet production in Rosario? The four options involved were (1) to 
substitute Rosario billet production, and also the purchases of billets from 
outside suppliers, by integrating the Acevedo plant with modern ore-reduction, 
steelmaking and billet making facilities (i.e. blast furnaces, oxygen converters 
and blooming-slabbing mills, or a direct reduction plant, electric furnaces and 
continuous casting); (.2) to substitute expensive Rosario billets by purchases of 
lower cost billets on the open market; (3) to replace the Rosario plant's Siemens 
Martin furnaces by a single electric arc furnace, and to replace the plant's ingot 
casting system by continuous casting; or (4) to expand investment and billet 
production at a faster rate in its new Marathon plant, so as tovreplace the billet 
output from the Rosario plant. Any of these four options, on the face of it, seem 
as if they would have been superior to the option actually followed by Acindar of 
keeping its old 'grandad' plant in business. 
7/ This was the differential that applied on 1.2.77 according to internal 
company figures for billets of a common steel grade (1017) produced in both the 
Rosario and Marathon plants. 
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Now this reasoning would probably have been correct in a "first-best" economic 
context, - and Acindar's directors have in fact been considering closing down the 
Rosario plant for more than twenty three years! Yet the sentence of execution under 
which this plant has been operating has never been carried out because - as we 
shall seek to show - in the "nth-best" economic context of the Argentine steel 
industry it has never yet proved simultaneously both possible and profitable for 
Acindar to do so. 
Section "Imperfections" in the economic context of the Argentine steel industry 
We have now introduced the 'paradox' of the Rosario plant, and it is the 
purpose of this present section to offer an explanation of it. Obviously a simple 
explanation would have been that Acindar possessed an unenterprising or 
technologically laggard management - but as the information presented in Section 1 
shows,this explanation cannot be sustained. 
Another immediate candidate for explaining the surprising Rosario lifespan 
is labour relations - i.e. the pressure on, or the desires of Acindar management 
to avoid putting their Rosario plant staff out of work. However this explanation 
does not square with the facts either, as Acindar was always able to offer 
alternative employment in its Villa Constitución plants to virtually all those who 
would have been put out of work by closing down the Rosario plant. The labour 
factor did not therefore limit Acindar's range of options at all. 8/ 
A satisfactory explanation that does fit the facts is that Acindar did not 
adopt any of these four alternative options because the existence of various 
pronounced "imperfections" in the economic context of the postwar Argentine steel 
industry made each one of the alternative "superior" options either (i) impossible 
to take up, or (ii) less profitable in prospect, on the information then available, 
than the option of continuing billet production in the old-fashioned Rosario plant 9/ 
8/ Some further considerations help explain the lack of labour pressure 
on Acindar's directors so far as resistance to possible closure was concerned. 
Firstly, company plans involved not the close-down of the whole plant but 
only of the steel shop involving. 400 to 500 of the workers. Secondly the plait's 
siting in Rosariot a major city of 800,000 people, offered alternative job 
opportunities -specially to the sizeable proportion of men performing such jobs 
as mechanical or electrical maintenance, refractory brick laying etc - i.e. 
skills readily transferable to other jobs. Thirdly the long-service status of 
many of the potentially affected workers meant that they could excercise an 
early retirement option involving the company in only s mall extra costs by way 
of compensation payments. All these factors, plus the ability to offer work at 
Villa Constitución meant that Acindar's option'to close the Rosario steel units 
was never blocked by the labour force. 
9/ The economic comparison was between each alternative option that would 
involve radically new technology and the option of continuing production in the 
old-fashioned but nevertheless improvable Rosario plant. As we show further on, 
Acindar was in fact able to greatly upgrade its Rosario plant and thus to reduce, 
although not reverse, the economic inferiority of the plant's old-fashioned 
technology as compared to best-practice technology. This success raises the 
economically interesting theme of just how "upgradeable" old-vintage technologies 
are, and we make some remarks on this in Part III of the paper. 
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The chart below,which is based on detailed research on Acindar's 
evolution, outlines why each one of these four apparently superior technological 
options were not taken up by Acindar and the chart also identifies the type of 
"imperfection" responsible for ruling out the superior strategy in each case. 
What this chart shows is how three factors, namely (i) prolonged official 
Chart U. Summary of why app-tr^ntlv superior technological strategies which would have involved the 
closure or radical modernization of the Rosario plant were not adopted by Acindar 
Period Superior technological strategy Reason why Acindar did not adopt it Type of "imperfection" 
involved 
1953-75 Substitute Rosario billet production 
and also the billets purchased from 
outside sources by integrating the 
Villa Constitución plant with ore-
reduction, steelmaking and billet 
making facilities based on modem 
technology. 
Acindar's successive integration projects between 




1963-76 Purchase billets from the "open 
market" at lower prices than the 
costs of Rosario billets. 
(1) Billet sales made available only from or 
through S 0 M T ° A vere frequently rationed 
- causing Acindar to go without the full • 
quantities of billets it wanted in 7 of the 
13 years under consideration. Keeping Rosario 
billet production going thus increased 
Acindar.'s security of supply. 
(2) Also SOMISA's billet prices and Rosario's 
billet costs were closely similar in the 
period from 1969 to 1976 (except from January 
1973 to January 1975 when SOMISA's billets 
were much cheaper). Cost comparisons did not 
therefore usually suggest any marked advantage 
in substituting SOMISA billets for Rosario 
billets, even if it could be safely assumed 
that the former would be available in the 
Quantities needed. 
Rationing in factor 
markets (billets). 
Monopoly price setting 
by government controled 
steel works. 
1961-68 Replace the Rosario plant's Siemens 
Martin furnaces by electric arc 
furnaces, - and (in some projects) 
also replace the plant's ingot 
casting system by continuous 
casting. 
Projects embodying the first or both of these 
measures could, with hindsight have been 
rationally adopted, and were in fact actively 
considered during this period. However they were 
rationally rejected at the time given the 
legitimate expectations by Acindar's directors 
that they would soon be able to go ahead with 
their"integration project for the Acevedo plant 
(which then enjoyed active government approval). 
Uncertain and shifting 
planning perspectives 
caused by the alternations 
of government policy 
towards the private steel 
sector. 10/ 
1969-71 Replace the Rosario plant's Siemens 
Martin furnaces by electric arc 
furnaces, - and (in some projects) 
also replace the plant's ingot 
casting system by continuous 
casting. 
In this period such measures were ruled out owing 
to shortage of investment funds, because Acindar's 
directors were pursuing the sound policy of 
increasing the enterprise's liquidity so as to 
recover from (a) scr>e trading losses, and (b) from 
having been forced by the government to write off 
its investment in the previously rejected blast-
furnace integration project, and to pay back to 
the government the previous tax deductions which 
the enterprise had enjoyed by virtue of the 
regime promoting integration projects. 
Uncertain and shifting 
planning perspectives 
caused by the alternations 
of government policy 
towards the private steel 
sector. 10/ 
1972-76 Expand investment and billet 
production in the modern Marathon 
plant faster than was actually done, 
so as to replace Rosario's billet 
output. 
Not possible mainly due to the lack of security 
of supply with respect to getting adequate 
qualities of high-grade scrap - since this raw 
material was in short supply in Argentina as 
well as being subjcct to import rationing. 
Rationing in factor markets 
(high quality scrap). 
Source: Author's compilación based on information gathered during case-study. 
constraints on investment and changing official plans for the steel industry 10/ 
(ii) billet rationing and high billet prices on the "open market", and (iii) 
inelasticities in the supply of high quality scrap, have all combined to make 
Acindar's continuance of the Rosario plant a rational decision on the part of the 
enterprise. This will now be explained in a little more detail. 
In the first place the prolonged "no through road" placed by successive 
Argentine authorities on Acindar's various integration projects 10/coupled with 
the insecurity of supply of billets bought from or via SOMISA and the usual non-
existence of any marked cost advantages in the price of SOMISA billets compared 
to the cost of Rosario billets, meant that the continuation of the Rosario plant 
was needed so that Acindar could be sure of having at least a fraction of the 
billets it needed. The point was that any lack of sufficient billet supplies 
inevitably meant expensive idle capacity on the finishing mill(s) and all the 
ancillary machinery in the Acevedo plant. Therefore, as one of Acindar's direc-
tors put it "each kilo of additional steel justifies itself to the extent that it 
makes it possible to get all these sections working". Hence, it was certainly 
better for Acindar to continue steel production in the Rosario plant rather 
than just shut it down. 
Secondly, if one considers the radical modernization options which Acindar 
rejected for the Rosario plant, these rejections should be understood as correct 
strategy at the time, given the legitimate expectations of Acindar's directors 
that their integration project for the Acevedo plant would be approved. 
10/ Steel industry investments in Argentina, since 1941, have depended on 
receiving the green light both from the government of the day and from the Dirección 
General de Fabricaciones Militares (i.e. General Directorate of Military Production, 
DGFM) - and it never proved possible until 1975 for Acindar to obtain the final 
approval from both sets of authorities for it to proceed with its successive plant 
integration projects. In this respect Acindar suffered a similar fate to all the 
other major Argentine private steel enterprises whose integration projects were 
also all rejected or interrupted with the result that from 1947 to 1976 - i.e. 
almost three decades, the DGFM has had a "de-facto" monopoly of the Argentine 
production of steel starting out from iron ore. 
The principal cause of the long chain of frustrations for Acindar and 
other private steelmakers was the frequent and unpredictable alternation of Argentine 
government policies which (a) from time to time promoted the integration of private 
steel plants, and then (b; sometimes provided conditional approval to specific 
integration projects put forward by one or other private steel enterprise, only to 
end up in (c) the final interruption or rejection of each and every specific 
integration project often after prolonged investment of time and money £>y the 
enterprise concerned. 
Inevitably this chain of events interfered with orderly planning by the 
private enterprises concerned and led to inferior investment options having to 
be taken up, suspension of projects for which previous stages had been completed, 
etc. 
Acindar, tor instance, had at least six different integration projects 
between 1953 and 1971 rejected by the authorities - and it was only in 1975 that 
they received the final go-ahead needed from the authorities to proceed with the 
construction of their direct reduction plant, which, when it starts up in 1978, 
will be realizing the integration plan already firmly announced by Acindar's 
founder Arturo Acevedo in the company's Annual Report and Accounts of 1949! 
- 10 -
Finally, Acindar's rejection of expanding the Marathon plant's billet 
production faster was due to a rational assessment that the risks that high-grade 
scrap supplies would be rationed were too big to justify abandoning the security 
of the Rosario plant's billet production which was based on the use of lower 
average grades of scrap that were in much easier supply. 
Thus, Acindar's strategy of keeping the Rosario plant in business so long 
was perfectly defensible in profit maximisation terms,but only because of the 
strongly imperfect economic context in which Acindar had to function. 11/ 
The interesting economic point here is that the conventional assumption that 
is usually made about "well functioning factor markets" does not correspond to 
the real situation that existed during significant periods in Acindar's evolution 
- particularly so far as billets are concerned, and to a lesser extent for scrap 
supplies. 
Also, so far as the supply of the factor "capital" was concerned, the deviation 
of Acindar's real situation from conventional assumptions lies in the fact that 
the presence of government constraints on investment makes it impossible to refer 
to the existence of a "proper" market for capital in the usual sense. The point 
is that Acindar could not, as firms normally can do in "theory of the firm" models, 
freely hire the amounts of the capital factor it wanted in thè certainty of being 
able to embody that capital swiftly in a functioning plant. The existence and use 
of official powers to veto investment projects meant that the mere ability and 
desire to "hire" capital and other factors was not enough to ensure that the 
associated projects would be permitted to go ahead. 
Obviously, then, once inelastic factor supplies and/or substantial bureaucratic 
constraints on investment come to form part of the real economic context in which 
11/ As the reader will be aware, we have taken the liberty of suggesting 
in this paper that the technological strategy followed by Acindar in the Rosa-
rio plant was "first-best. However, this needs some qualification. First of all, 
as we showed earlier, the decision not to modernise the Rosario plant early in 
the sixties turned out, retrospectively, to have been an error, since the firnfs 
integration project got delayed far longer than could have been reasonably 
expected and in turn greatly prolonged the useful economic life of the Rosario 
plant. Had this been foreseen, then the radical modernization of the plant 
- which was carefully considered by Acindar at the time- would definitely have 
been undertaken. However, anybody can be an investment genius with the benefit 
of hindsight! 
Secondly, even leaving out the hindsight aspect, we are not trying to 
claim that Acindar's directors never made any mistakes or errors of judgement, 
and nor are we claiming that they always invested the exact "optimum optimorum" 
in technical change in the Rosario plant. Instead, what we have tried to show 
is that several apparently "superior" technological strategies discussed in 
the text were either impossible for Acindar to implement (due to government 
restrictions) or else were rejected by Acindar's directors on rational and 
defensible grounds given the company's profit maximisation objectives. It is 
in this sense that the strategy of keeping the Rosario plant going, and (as we 
show in Section 5) upgrading it by low cost technical changes, can be seen as 
an election by Acindar's directors of the"first-best technological option that 
was open to them. ' i 
a steelplant functions, it follows that the investment, output and technical change 
strategies which such a plant will rationally follow will no longer conform to 
what would be "first-best" strategy for a maximising firm which is completely free 
to invest as it deems best, and which is faced by elastic factor markets. 
So when the economic context is "imperfect", strategies which one 
conventionally regards as inferior may in fact prove to have been correct profit-
maximising strategies given the constraints that actually prevailed in that context 
at the times when decisions had to be made. This is the interpretation which in 
our opinion fits with, and satisfactorily explains, the 'paradox' that the old 
fashioned Rosario plant is still producing today. 
Section 5. The technological strategy pursued in the Rosario plant 
Interestingly for our purposes, there is a second surprise for economists in 
the record of the Rosario plant in addition to the challenge of tracing the 
peculiar economics which has enabled this old plant to survive. For, what turns 
out to be equally interesting and 'peculiar' is the evolution over time of the 
plant's technology. Not only has the plant's antiquated technology been 
maintained in action over such a long period but, still more significant, it has 
been greatly improved over time by a long series of piecemeal technical adaptations 
and improvements. What one sees in Rosario, therefore, is not the text book 
chronicle of major modernizations involving switchovers from earlier to later 
generations of technology, but rather the story of a prolonged series of 
evolutionary improvements in the original installed technology. In fact it is 
possible to observe over thirty years of evolutionary improvements m the 
technology of the Rosario plant - a longer period that could have been observed 
had the functioning and planning of the postwar Argentine economy and its steel 
industry been more rational than was actually the case. In a more rational 
economic environment, Acindar could have scrapped the Rosario plant some fifteen 
to twenty years ago, in favour of more up to date steelmaking technology. The fact 
that it didn't (and still hasn't) is what makes the evolution of the Rosario 
plant's technology a worthwhile subject to explore. 
Therefore, the nature of the changes introduced by Acindar into the 
technology of the Rosario plant forms the theme which we shall now take up in this 
final section of the case study: 
To explore this technological theme the starting point is to recall from the 
above discussion of "imperfections" how Acindar found itself repeatedly "saddled" 
with having to make the best out of its outmoded Rosario technology because 
superior technological strategies were continually ruled out. In consequence, 
the dynamic problem for Acindar became that of seeking to introduce improvements, 
replacements, additions, etc. into the outmoded Rosario technology so as to 
improve the plant's efficiency and adjust the plant to the changing requirements 
on it. 
However, the solution to this dynamic problem was not so easy, as on the 
one hand, Acindar's directors could not invest much money in the outmoded plant 
because its future economic lifetime was always feared to be short; yet on the 
other hand they could not rationally avoid seeking to introduce such changes as 
were necessary to (a) maintain the plant's economic viability in the face of 
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changing economic circumstances, and (b) to match the changing urgency of the 
needs of Acindar as a whole tor the billets and finished rolled output of the plant. 
The premium was therefore always on finding ingenious low cost ways of 
upgrading and adapting the Rosario plant rapidly to fit in with the changing 
circumstances and needs. 12 / In the event these ingenious ways were, to an 
impressive extent, found. 
To illustrate this, space permits us only to refer to three of the most out-
standing features of the technical changes introduced. These are, first, the 
extent to which the production capacity of all the plant's mam process units has 
been increased by technical changes; second, the long record ot technical changes 
introduced into the plant's finishing mill to diversity its product mix; and 
third the critical importance of the endogenous creative efforts of the Rosario 
plant's staff in making this impressive record of low-cost technical change possible. 
To demonstrate the first outstanding feature - i.e. increases achieved in 
production capacity - we can begin by referring to the Rosario plant's Siemens 
Martin furnaces. These have been subjected to a long series of modifications 
throughout their history, in which the most consistently important design objective 
pursued - though not the only one - was to increase the production capacity of 
these furnaces. As a result, the annual production capacity per Siemens Martin 
furnace has been raised from approximately 20,000 tons per annum in the early 
1940's to around 50,000 tons per annum today with the interesting consequence 
that these Rosario plant furnaces are today clearly superior m terms of annual 
output capacity to all the comparable furnaces in other Argentine steelplants 13/. 
A similar success story applies to the Rosario plant's billet mill. This was 
originally installed m 1950 with a production capacity of around 50,000 tons per 
year, however this capacity has been raised by a whole series of minor technical 
changes so that the Billet mill's capacity today is over 160,000 tons per year. 
This was achieved with a remarkably low investment, and with no change in the 
originally installed horsepower of the mill. Indeed this mill is widely 
acknowledged in the Argentine steel industry as a "peach of a mill" and is more 
12 / The low level of investment in the Rosario plant emerges clearly from 
inspection ot data in the company's file of investment projects approved. For 
example between 1967-68 and 1976-77 Acindar's directors approved investments 
totalling approximately U$S 7 million in the Rosario plant compared to 
U$S 22 million in the Acevedo plant and U$S 27 million in the Marathon plant. 
13/ This emerges clearly if the three Rosario Siemens Martin furnaces of 
approximately 30 tons static furnace capacity are compared to all the similar 
Siemens Martin furnaces ranging from 21 to 45 tons static capacity that are 
found in other Argentine firms. In terms ot total annual production capacity 
per ton of static furnace capacity, the figures for each firm in 1973 were Ohler 
S.A. 704 tons; La Cantábrica 850 tons; Santa Rosa 897 tons; Tamet 1,000 tons; 
Acindar Rosario 1,667 tons. These figures were calculated by the author based 
on capacity data found in Julio J. Montu "Tendencias tecnológicas en los programas 
de expansión de las mmiplantas siderúrgicas en Argentina", ILAFA Congress, 
Buenos Aires, 1973. 
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productive than other more modern primary rolling mills in Argentina which have 
twice the installed horsepower and involved more than twice as much investment. 
As for the plant's finishing mill the annual capacity of this unit has also 
been greatly improved - from around 50,000 to around 120,000 tons - mainly by 
means of substantial mechanisation and layout improvements. 
The exact extent of all these capacity increases is summarised in the table 
shown below 
iaujo ]. Jlioi'C.'K'.e in (.h.t piv.luct jnii c.M'.-ic i -i y -.'< I •.">:;.u-iu'jvlnnt vuiits duo to technical change. 
Installation Time Period 
Working i'y Pi I he unit 
at the befjNIL.!UP, CM the period 
(t onr./om'ivit. i nr. hmir ) 
Working c.ipjcity of the unit 
ut t lie end ui the period 






1911 to 1972-73 2.75 6.32 130 
Siemens Martin 
N°2 Farnace 





3.80 6.32 66 
Billet mill 195't--55 to 
1973-7H 
8.30 ft 19.00« 129 




9.90 17.20 714 
s* In the case of the billet mill, the available capacity figures refer to tons per shift hour , rather than tons per 
operating hour. 
Sources: ]_/ I v : - J b,. the- author from hirtorictil production data in the Rosario plant technical reports supplemented by 
addition^1. data ; vide i by .•.-•': • • •• staff. 
This table shows that increases ranging from 66% to 130% over initial 
design capacity were brought about as a result of technical changes - an 
impressive degree of "capacity-stretching" by any standards. 14/ 
11+/ The great economic importance to Acindar of this "capacity stretching" 
achieved in the Rosario plant can be appreciated by reference to the major change 
in the plant's billet production "mission" in the period from 1962-63 onwards. 
Before then, the role of billet production in Rosario was basically to keep on 
going, with a minimum of maintenance investment, until its expected forthcoming 
shutdown, and to supply the Rosario plant's own finishing mill with approximately 
50,000 tons of billets for rolling into bars and sections. But in 1962, with the 
coming on stream of a massive increment to the Acevedo plant's finishing mill 
capacity, and with the firm's integration project bogged down in official 
uncertainties - the billet mill's "mission" was radically changed to one of 
providing feedstock to the Acevedo plant's expanded- finishing mill - so the 
Rosario plant had to expand its output of billets rapidly. Then, throughout the 
rest of the sixties and early seventies, the ups and downs of Acindar's integration 
project, plus frequent billet rationing in the market, led to repeated demands 
on the Rosario plant to increase its billet production still further. So from 
1962 onwards, historical circumstances exogenous to the plant (and mainly 
exogenous to Acindar as a whole) led to a virtually permanent "output-expanding" 
mission for billet production in the Rosario plant. 
The point is that this mission was fulfilled in the Rosario plant mainly 
by means of "capacity-stretching" technical change in the steelmaking section 
and billet mill of the Rosario plant. The only "duplication" type investment 
made by Acindar in this period to increase output was the addition of a third 
Siemens Martin furnace in the Rosario plant to join the two already installed. 
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The second very notable feature of the Rosario plant's technical change 
record concerns the many changes introduced over time into the plant's finishing 
mill with the aim of diversifying the range of products that could be produced on 
this mill. Indeed, no less than 14 different classes of products 
have been produced on this finishing mill since 1943, and the average rate of 
launch of classes of new products by the mill has been approximately one class of 
new product every two years. (Furthermore one must remember that within each 
class of product the mill has produced a whole range of sizes and grades). 
This ability of Acindar to adapt the Rosario finishing mill to different 
products has been vital not only to keep up with the evolving sophistication of 
market demand - for example new qualities and shapes of reinforcing bars have 
taken over much of the market which was previously served by plain reinforcing 
bars - but also to maintain the viability of the Rosario finishing mill in the 
face of expansions in the rolling capacity of the modern Morgan rolling mills of 
the Acevedo plant. In other words, product diversifying technical change on this 
mill was an extremely important and successfully used tactic for ensuring that 
the unit, when threatened by changing markets and rival technology, could broaden 
its product mix to avoid becoming obsolete. 15/ 
In summary, then, the record of the Rosario plant both in "stretching" the 
capacity of its "old-vintage" units - and in adapting its finishing mill to a long 
series of product diversifications, all on a low budget, seems to have been a 
definite success. 
This now brings us to the third outstanding aspect of the technical change 
record of the plant - which concerns the sources of the technical changes 
introduced. The striking feature of the plant's record in this respect is the 
notable degree to which the technical changes introduced have involved a creative 
niiit>>jj«ni.iiM ( i . rt. " in-hi nifiri" ) i i nit r i l.ii l ii in , nidtitr l.y l he plant's own staff. 
Indeed it one analyses the most. impnrlauL teclmicaJ change projects wliii li 
were carried out throughout the life of the plant, and which involved sizeable 
investments in new and modified equipment, it turns out that the endogenous 
15/ A superb example of this tactic in the history of the mill refers to 
the diversification carried' out in 1972-73 into producing special steel for ;ing 
bars for the automobile industry. The need to diversify had been caused by the 
start-up of the second Morgan rolling mill in the Acevedo plant, which caused 
the Rosario finishing mill's output to drop in one year from around 90,000 tons 
to around 15,000 tons. The challenge then involved for the Rosario plant was to 
modify its finishing mill so as to give it a "different focus". When the mill 
was built it was designed to produce "tonnage" in common steel products, but 
"we then had to modify it to produce dimensional precision in special steel 
products". This required - amongst other important changes - the designing and 
building of two new mill stands with specially designed housing and bearings, 
and equipped with variables speed motor's, to replace the ox is 1: in)', unils, so vh.it 
the rolling operation could be carried out with the necessary precision. It 
offers an excellent example of technical changes being carried out on "fixed" 
capital so as to "mobilize" it to fulfil a radically changed product mission. 
- 15 -
contribution to these projects has been the dominant factor in at least 75^ of 
the major projects. This contribution went far beyond the mere installation of 
equipment provided by machinery supplying firms, or the simple following of outside 
designs and layouts. The really notable point is that many of the projects were 
designed "in-house", and incorporated creative and original ideas, layouts and 
equipment specifications. 
The following examples all illustrate the great importance of the "endogenous" 
contribution. 
First of all the billet mill: - this mill has been extensively modified and 
its performance upgraded entirely as a result of small design and engineering 
changes generated "in-plant". For instance, in a major overhaul of the mill in 
1969-70, the Rosario plant's rolling mill division and its engineering division 
designed, planned and executed nineteen separate modifications to the mill, 
affecting virtually all its component units. 16/ 
Secondly, the finishing mill: - this mill, too, has been extensively 
improved by "in-plant" design and engineering. Indeed, the major two-stage 
reform of this mill which was carried out in 1970-71, and in 1972-73, offers an 
outstanding "text-book" example of what can be achieved by internally generated 
learning, design and engineering - so much so, that this project was the subject 
of a lecture given to an international Latin American conference on Rolling 
technology in Buenos Aires in May 1976. 17/ 
Thirdly, the plant's steelmaking units: - all three Siemens Martin furnaces 
were designed and constructed by Rosario engineers. Also the incorporation of 
major improvements to the furnaces, such as the switchover from acid to basic 
16/ For instance, they redesigned and enlarged the mill's reheat furnace, 
modified the ingot charging and discharging zones, modified the layout and action 
of many of the mill's inter stage transport units, redesigned the mill's lifting 
table and hydraulic system, improved instrumentation and process control, etc. 
17/ This project was developed, designed and implemented under the leader-
snip of the Director of the Rosario plant's rolling division, with assistance from 
his Deputy, and from the plant's engineering division. It had three major 
objectives: 1) to increase the capacity of the mill by a factor of 70% on the 
basis of its existing product mix, from 70,000 tons per year to 120,000 tons per 
y«ar to meet immediately prensing demand; ?) to modify the mill so as to equip it 
lor a major product diverr;if icat ion into t 11< > product ion o| .viper ¡. 11 ?-ie-..| lor^iu^ 
bars for the automobile industry, in view of the impending planned transfer to 
Acindar's Acevedo plant of the majority of the existing product mix produced on the 
mill; 3) to take into account in the design the possibility of a still further 
diversification in the future into the production of small-diameter alloy steel 
round bars. The first two stages of this project were successfully completed and 
have been a great, economic '.mc.cenr,, wh I I e the third r. tuy/-. i:; currently -being Jv-ld 
in reserve pending the evolution of market demand. Sec Oscar R. Anior.ini, "Pernod«--
lación del tren de laminación de perfiles pequeños y livianos" in Laminación, tec-
nología, equipos, productos, published hy TLAFA, Santiago de Chile, 1976. 
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lining and the injection of oxygen into the metallic hath, involved strong 
participation by Rosario personnel. Furthermore, the major improvements to the 
plant's cupola melting furnaces - including the use of a more durable refractory 
lining and the introduction of hot-air injection were the result of considerable 
experimentation and engineering by Rosario plant personnel. 
These above examples demonstrate the highly significant contribution made 
by "in-house" technical effort in important investment projects carried out in 
the Rosario plant. 
In addition to its important input in these major projects, the "in-house" 
contribution has also been extremely important in the innumerable minor 
technical improvement projects carried out in the Rosario plant. 
It is therefore clear that technical progress in the plant has been 
achieved with a large contribution of "endogenous" original inventive and 
engineering efforts. Indeed, one clearly visible result of this is that much of 
the Rosario plant's present equipment is now remarkably "idiosyncratic" in the 
sense that it incorporates a large number of "home made" designs, equipment 
features and improvements which will not be found in any machinery manufacturer's 
catalogs. 18/ 
Of course, there has been an important "exogenous" contribution too, which 
we have not analysed here, which has come from Acindar's central production, 
engineering and technical departments in Villa Constitución and Buenos Aires, and 
to a lesser extent, from machinery suppliers and - in two important projects -
18/ It is nevertheless interesting to see that some of the experience 
gained in the Rosario plant by its engineers has been transferable beyond the 
confines of the plant. For example, the present Director of the plant-who 
developed his whole career there- has also contributed to several major tech-
nical changes in the Morgan mills of the Acevedo plant. Furthermore this man 
gives lectures on Rolling Technology sponsored by the Instituto Argentino de 
Siderurgia to audiences of engineers and technical personnel drawn from a 
wide range of steel and other metallurgical firms. 
A further interesting point in this regard is that, according to the 
Rosario plant's current Supervisor of Rolling mills, the plant affords supe-
rior learning opportunities to its technical personnel than does the Acevedo 
plant. This is because the relative lack of specialization of personnel that 
is possible in slow-speed mills like Rosario's permits the technical personnel 
to grapple with virtually the whole range of problems and variables involved 
in the rolling operations in contrast to the situation on hich speed mills 
where personnel are usually required to specialize in one or two aspects of 
the overall operation, thus limiting their range of experience. 
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from outside consultants 19/; and there have been some significant replacements 
of equipment carried out - e.g. the Bar and Section mill's reheat furnace, which 
was replaced in 1970-71 - however the "leitmotif" of the technical change record 
of the Rosario plant has clearly been endogenously generated modifications to the 
existing equipment.20/furthermore, it was precisely this creative endogenous 
contribution which provided the low cost solutions which permitted Acindar to 
"make the best" out of the situation of having to keep the Rosario plant going. 
In other words, given that "imperfections" in the economic context 
continually made the extension of the Rosario plant's life necessary, it was a 
blessing for Acindar that it could draw on the strong endogenous creativity of 
the Rosario plant's engineers in finding ingenious ways of upgrading and adapting 
the old plant. This unquestionably had the effect of greatly softening the 
negative economic impact on Acindar of not being able to proceed with its more 
optimal technological solutions. 
Section 6. Review and summary 
We are now in a position to review and summarise the case study just 
presented so as to refresh the reader's memory on the main points that were 
covered. 
19/ Jin_the Rosario plant the two major projects involving leadership by 
outside consultants were (i) the installation of the plant's billet mill in 1949-
50, and (ii) the modification of ingot casting practice and the accompanying 
intensification of quality control and inspection procedures in plant in 1960-61. 
The first of these projects corresponds to a straightforward move to greater 
capital intensity. The second project, however, offers a mixed picture: - i.e. 
on the one hand there was a move to slightly greater capital intensity in ingot 
casting due to the modifications introduced, but on the other hand this shift was 
almost certainly outweighed by the considerable increase in the labour force 
employed in the new procedures of quality control inspection that were also 
introduced by the consultant. 
20 / This type of technical change seems to be exactly what Atkinson and 
Stiglitz had in mind when they developed their alternative view of technical 
changes as being "localized": - see J.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, "A New View 
of Technical Change", Economic Journal, Vol. LXXIX, 315, September 1969. Paul 
David has also made use of the concept of "localized" technical change, and he 
adds the hypothesis that sequences of localized technical change tend to be neutral 
in their effect on the capital-labour ratio. This.is an extremely interesting 
- and in my view implausible - hypothesis which needs to be tested empirically. 
See P.A. David, Technical Choice, Innovation and Growth, Cambridge University Press, 
1975, p. 58 onwards. 
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Right at the start, when reviewing the current technology of the Rosario 
plant, it appeared that something was "wrong" - namely that in a world which had 
long witnessed the breakthrough of the electric arc furnace and continuous 
casting all over the globe as best-practice billet making technology for small 
scale steelplants, that there should still exist a plant based on Siemens Martin 
furnaces and ingot casting producing merrily away. 
Of course, if capital, labour and raw materials has been "hirable" by Acindar 
in "properly" functioning factor marxets - i.e. those in which factor rationing 
leading to more than just short-run supply inelasticities did not occur, and in 
which bureaucratic investment constraints blocking investments were not an 
important feature - then Acindar would have integrated its Acevedo plant or else 
bought electric arc furnaces and continuous casting to replace the outmoded 
Rosario technology long ago. Indeed, they consistently wanted to do so. 
But the reality of "factor rationing" and "bureaucratic investment 
constraints", coupled with the uncertainties as to the future of both the 
rationing and the constraints, and also the opportunity costs of investing 
heavily in modernizing the Rosario plant, all combined to rationally rule out 
the "normal well behaved" path of technical change in the Rosario plant, which 
would have involved either (i) its radical modernization to electric arc and 
continuous casting, or (ii) its scrapping many years ago in favour of acquiring 
billet supplies from the open market or from the integration of the Acevedo 
plant with up-to-date steelmaking technology. 
The decision was therefore to keep the Rosario plant going, with relatively 
low levels of investment in modernizing it - which at the same time also 
subjected engineering efforts to a technological constraint. Then, given this 
set of conditions (produced by the described situation), the path of technical 
change in the Rosario plant became inevitably one of piecemeal upgrading and 
adaptation of the plant in accordance with both the changing requirements on it, 
and with whatever the endogenous creativity of the plant's staff could generate 
in the way of low cost improvements. 21 / 
Essentially therefore, the constraints operating in the economic context 
of the Rosario plant imposed a virtually permanent delay in the adoption of best 
practice techniques, a far longer delay than the one visualised by Salter in a 
"well-behaved" path of technical change. In Salter's model, technical change to 
best practice techniques becomes obligatory on the firm as soon as the unit 
variable operating plus capital costs of producing a product with the "best-
practice" technique; falls below the variable operating costs of the "outmoded" 
technique. Indeed, at that moment, the "outmoded" technique becomes no longer 
21/ For many of the improvements made in the Rosario plant the stimulus 
came from very specific equipment malfunctions and processing problems. The 
Superintendent of the plant's rolling mills has described the "design philosophy" 
which he and his colleagues applied, as follows: "To go along, eliminating 
passes, redesigning mill rolls so as to minimize problems, to roll with greater 
crossrsection wherever possible, to try to minimize production halts and nuisances, 
and if possible to withdraw men because it's a pretty unpleasant type of work 
involving risks of getting burnt. To go along making adjustments in the elements 
or ancillary machinery of the mill which bring you problems". 
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profitable to operate. It is therefore; by definition, then obsolete and must be 
replaced or scrapped. 22/ 
But a technique which is obsolete assuming properly functioning factor 
markets and freedom of entrepreneurs to invest, is by no means necessarily 
obsolete when these assumptions do not apply. With unsatisfied market demand for 
an outmoded plant's products (in this case billets), and with raw material supplies 
for a potentially competing best practice technology rationed (which happened for 
the high quality scrap for the Marathon plant), it is not difficult to see how an 
outmoded technique like the Rosario plant's can go on for a long time being 
outmoded without actually becoming obsolete (i.e. profitable to replace). Equally, 
if the investment funds which are needed to actually install competing best-
practice plants are not available or are bureaucratically frozen or vetoed, then 
the market in which the outmoded technique is operating is in a sense "shut off" 
from advances in technology in such a way as to prevent outmoded techniques from 
ever becoming obsolete. 
In short, in a well functioning economic context, advances in technology 
progressively forced outmoded techniques into becoming obsolete, at a rhythm 
which depends basically on factor prices and on the extent of the technological 
superiority of the new techniques. But malfunctions or imperfections in the 
eoonomic context, can slow this rhythm down temporarily, or in the extreme case 
permanently, thus forcing entrepreneurs to continue production in more and more 
outmoded plants. This is the kind of situation into which the experience of the 
Rosario plant fits. Let us now turn to look at the dynamic consequences. 
Once "saddled" with having to make the best of outmoded technology because 
superior technological strategies are ruled out, the dynamic problem becomes to 
introduce profitable improvements, replacements, additions, etc. into the outmoded 
technology. Ideally, the entrepreneur would wish that the context would permit 
him to switch from his outmoded vintage to best practice technology, but the 
context does not allow him to do that. So, as his "first-best" option given the 
context he is in, the entrepreneur seeks to improve his outmoded technology within 
the existing constraints. Nevertheless, there is still an important dilemma: for 
if the entrepreneur has reasonable expectations that the context may shortly be 
about to improve, he may be loath to invest much in improving the outmoded 
technology that he still hopes he will soon be able to scrap. If however he does 
not take the opportunity to make improvements in his outmoded technology and the 
obstacles preventing superior technological strategies remain in force, then the 
entrepreneur will find himself with technology which is becoming more and more 
outmoded and ill-adapted every day - and will therefore find himself under greater 
and greater pressure to modernize it. 
Repeatedly faced with exactly this dilemma, the solution which Acindar 
applied in its Rosario plant was to make repeated demands on the ingenuity of the 
plant's own engineers to squeeze maximum production out of the plant's old-
fashioned steelmaking and billet units and to inject maximum flexibility into the 
plant's finishing mill unit, on the basis of a bare minimum of investment - and 
22/ See W.E.G. Salter's outstanding account of the economics of obsolescence, 
replacement and scrapping decisions in his well known book Productivity and 
Technical Change, Cambridge University Press 1960, esp. Chs. IV and V. 
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as the study showed, these demands were met with great success. Indeed it was 
precisely the creative ingenuity of its engineers that was able to compensate 
Acindar to a significant extent for the imperfections of its surrounding economic 
context. * 
PART III. REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE-STUDY 
In this final part of the paper, our aim is to step back from the micro-
details of the case study itself so as to reflect on some interesting economic 
issues that emerge from the Rosario plant's experience. 
To start with, it is worthy of note that if one surveys the panorama of 
Latin American steelmaking today, one comes across a quite appreciable number of 
plants which are based, like the Rosario plant, on long outmoded technologies 23/ 
- and one also find that "imperfections" in the form of government constraints 
on private investments, capital rationing, price-fixing on steel products, 
rationing of key raw material or energy supplies,etc. exist to a considerable 
}f{ Postscript on the closure of Rosario's Siemens Martin furnaces. As 
mentioned at the beginning of the case-study, it came to the author's attention 
after completion of the manuscript that Acindar had taken the decision, in 
November 1977, to finally close down the Rosario plant's Siemens Martin units. 
This was 34 years after the first heat from the NQ 1 furnace was tapped. 
The circumstances that made this decision finally possible were (i) that 
as from the end of 1978 or early 1979, Acindar will be able to count on an 
assured supply of cheaper billets produced by its new direct reduction cum arc-
steelmaking and continuous casting plant in Villa Constitución, so that the end 
of steelmaking in Rosario was already very near, coupled with (ii) the fact that 
for an interim period of 18 months between the closure of the Rosario plant and 
the time when Acindar can be sure of its own alternative supplies from the new 
plant, SOMISA has agreed to sell billets to Acindar at a 10% discount off normal 
prices in return for a firm commitment by Acindar to purchase not less than 
13,000 tons of billets per month for 18 months. 
This combination of (a) security of supply from SOMISA (given that this 
enterprise now has surplus steelmaking capacity due to the bringing back into 
production of its second blast furnace), and (b) favourable prices from SOMISA 
(due to the 10% discount), and (c) predictable planning horizons during the 
eighteen months to follow (since Acindar's new plant is now being constructed 
with full and continued government approval) represents a combination of favourable 
circumstances that have not existed at any point up until now in. Acindar's 
history. However, once this combination of circumstances came to exist, then the 
"straightforward" solution, so long postponed, of closing down the old Rosario 
Siemens Martin furnaces was one which Acindar's directors could quickly adopt. 
Apparently many of those present cried when the last heat of Rosario steel 
was tapped - yet it surely is an appropriate end to the Rosario saga that it should 
have required a hefty price discount from the giant state steel company to finally 
make these resistant old furnaces obsolete! 
23/ For example production of steel in Siemens Martin furnaces accounted 
for 42^ " of Latin American steel production as recently as 1975. Source "La Si-
derurgia latinoamericana en 1974-7 5 y Metas a 1980", ILAFA, Santiago, 1976. 
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extent in virtually all Latin American countries. Furthermore one does not have 
to delve very far into the history of the steel sector in each country to come 
across various examples of what appear to be gross errors of initial choices of 
technique 24/, and examples of quite a number of plants that have been pursuing 
frankly "nth-best" technological strategies. This is not meant to suggest that 
such examples represent the general rule in the Latin American steel industry; nor 
is it meant to suggest that Latin American national experiences with regard to thè 
steel industry have - when viewed as a whole - been any more irrational or trouble-
filled than have the experiences of many other continents or countries, including 
the most developed ones of all 25 /, but, equally, such examples cannot be 
considered as rare. In fact they are common enough to make one wonder whether 
(i) there is something inherently difficult about making correct technological 
choices in the steel industry, which would account for the existence of a fair 
proportion of disasters or monstrosities, or (ii) whether the examples of when 
things have obviously gone wrong can be attributed to "imperfections" of the kind 
found to be at work in the Argentine steel industry;or (iii) whether some of the 
fault may lie in the insufficient "fit" between steel industry realities and the 
economic concepts and tools which steel industry planners and executives use to 
help guide their technological choices and strategy. Of course these three 
explanations may be complementary rather than exclusive, and other explanations 
- perhaps more powerful - may well be put forward. But the problem itself - of 
•the not uncommon and socially costly recurrence of "sub-optimal" technological 
ctaices and strategies in the steel industry 26J - remains, and the problem is 
cf sufficient practical importance and impact in Latin American economies to merit 
some efforts to clarify possible causes. 
With this perspective in mind, we can now ask - what light, if any, does 
the present case-study throw on the problem of correct technological strategy in 
the Latin American steel industry, both with regard to "official" government 
policy for the industry, and with regard to best strategy for enterprises 
confronted with whatever is the official policy? In our view, the case-study does 
suggest some interesting insights in this respect. 
A first point suggested by the case-study is that one might, in making 
choices of technique and replacement decisions in steel technology, tend to 
24/ For instance, such' errors have been alleged with regard to the choices 
of Siemens Martin steelmaking technology by several Latin American state steel 
firms at a time when oxygen converters had already been adopted almost universally 
elsewhere. See G.S. Maddala ad P.T. Knight "International Diffusion of 
Technical Change - A Case-Study of the Oxygen Steelmaking Process", the Economic 
Journal N2 307, September 1967. 
25/ The recent battering being received by the U.S. steel industry at the 
hand of the Japanese, the chronic postwar oscillations of policy for the British 
steel industry and the conflicts between private and public sectors in the 
Indian steel industry are examples of this. 
26/ Obviously, the presence of defects in the competitive environment, or 
balance of payments crises or governmental or entrepreneurial planning errors can 
have consequences which go far beyond influencing just the technological variables 
in the steel industry - but in this paper the focus is precisely on the effect 
of such economic imperfections or errors on the technological variables. 
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underestimate the degree of improvement which can fce got out of old-vintage 
facilities by adaptive engineering. Thus we saw that very notable upgrading 
results were achieved in the Rosario plants in response to historical necessity, 
and were achieved at very low investment cost. This then raises the question 
as to whether other steelplants are taking full advantage of the upgrading 
possibilities which their history has not forced them to explore? 
Correlatively, we can take note of an exactly opposite potential error in 
choice of technique or replacement decisions, which consists in overestimating 
the degree of ease with which new best-practice technology (particularly if it 
also large-scale technology) can be brought into full operation. This error often 
arises because of leaving out of the economic calculations the time that will be 
taken by the firm's engineers and production staff to become familiar with the 
new equipment, to iron out the 'bugs' in getting it working properly, and to 
generate and analyse sufficient working experience to enable process-control to 
be progressively refined and improved until the plant is working at its designed 
performance levels. 27 / 
Obviously, both these two potential errors tend to pull in the same 
direction - which is to exaggerate the short-run profitability of those decisions 
which involve scrapping old vintage technology in favour of best-practice 
technology, and may thus lead to economically premature scrapping of serviceable 
and improvable old plant in favour of sophisticated new plant which brings all 
kinds of unforeseeen headaches with it. 
On the other hand, common though these two potential errors may be, they 
are hardly the errors which were most noticeable in the record of Acindar and its 
Rosario plant! Here, as we saw, the problem was not that a premature scrapping 
decision was made, but that the imperfections of the Argentine economic context 
have inordinately prolonged the existence of this old-fashioned plant,far beyond the 
point when, even taking into account its great potential for improvement, this 
technology should have been scrapped. 
Thus the Rosario case clearly illustrates one of the important reasons why 
plants may have their economic life prolonged beyond the economic optimum, - i.e. 
the existence of imperfections of various kinds in the surrounding context. It 
is, however, also relevant here to mention one other important reason why plants 
may go on being run too long. This concerns the entrepreneurial error of 
overestimating the degree of improvement and/or longevity that can be obtained by 
the ingenious patching up and modification of older plant (i.e. the exact opposite 
of the underestimation error in this regard that we mentioned earlier). This kind 
of error has been aptly described in the following way by a senior economic 
consultant to the British steel industry: 
"Everyone knows that the way to increase output at lowest investment 
cost is to improve existing plant. It is doing just this which landed 
27/ On this, apart from much empirical evidence, there is also an 
excellent theoretical paper worth seeing - R.S. Eckhaus "Absorptive Capacity as 
a Constraint due to Maturation Processes", in J.N. Bhagwati and R.S. Eckhaus, 
Development and Planning Essays in Honour of Paul Rosenstein Rodan, M.I.T. Press, 
Cambridge, 1973 
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the UK steel industry with much obsolescent plant when the British 
Steel Corporation took over in 1968. This may be an illustration of 
what is best from the financial return point of view is worst from 
the aspect of future efficiency. The homely analogy is that it is 
usually cheaper to patch up your old car and keep it going until the 
whole thing collapses, then you wish you had bought a better car 
earlier". 28/ 
This suggests that the pitfall involved in a deliberately prolonged 
strategy of actively "upgrading" old plant is that this strategy may discount the 
longer term future too heavily. Expressed more precisely, we can say that whilst 
there are likely to be very real and tangible short-term benefits in upgrading 
old plant - these benefits are definitely subject to a diminishing returns or 
"saturation" effect for technological reasons (e.g. due to the wearing out of 
plant or the inherent limits implied by the "technological regime" defined by 
the old vintage technology). And correlatively, although the short term benefits 
expected from adopting new technology may often be overestimated by entrepreneurs 
due to their false notions of the ease with which the many "headaches" 
accompanying new technology can be overcome, it is also true, as Bela Gold has 
pointed out, that "the long term benefits of technological innovations tend to be 
enhanced beyond the expectations leading to their r..loption, partly because of the 
continuity of technological development efforts and the increasingly effective 
integration of innovational operations with those surrounding them" 29 / - i.e. 
it is not only "old-vintage" and outmoded technologies that can be upgraded, new 
technologies can be upgraded too! And as Gold points out, there is usually a 
great deal of room for such upgrading to take place. 
What this whole discussion shows very clearly is that dynamic considerations, 
related to the upgrading of technologies over time as a result of the application 
of engineering efforts and investment, ought in theory to play a fundamental role 
in the determination of what constitutes optimal strategy with regard to choice of 
techniques, investment and scrapping decisions, and modification investments in 
existing steelplants. The trouble, however, is that many of the relevant factors 
are by no means easy to estimate. Indeed, the three tasks of assessing the 
upgrading possibilities for old technology, estimating the probable start-up and 
de-bugging time of prospective new technology, and estimating the longer term 
upgrading possibilities for prospective new technology are inherently difficult and 
error-prone. As a result they tend to be left out of the calculations or else 
estimated "intuitively" by the seat of the pants. 
Yet the fact remains that, implicitly at least, Latin American (and other) 
28J Private communication to the author. 
29/ This quotation, from Gold, continues as follows "Beyond these, 
experience demonstrates that additional gains in capacity, efficiency and control 
can usually be obtained merely by easing localized bottlenecks or constraints rather 
than adding to the system as a whole. And at least comparable gains may also 
accrue as interactions with marketing, procurement and transport come to be analysed 
and improved along with other organizational arrangements". See Bela Gold, "A 
Framework for Productivity Analysis", Ch. 2 of S. Eilon, B. Gold and J. Soesan, 
Applied Productivity Analysis for Industry, Pergamon, Oxford, 1976. 
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steel firms make such estimates, and subsequently then commit their scarce 
engineering resources to either upgrading the old, or else de-bugging and then 
upgrading the new. Equally, by their positive policies, or by the existence of 
the contextual "imperfections" which they permit, governments, too,tend to 
foreclose the options both of their own state steel firms, and of the private 
sector firms, thus in effect channelling both investment resources and engineering 
resources "blindly" into one or other of the alternative technological strategies 
of sticking with old technology or jumping to new. 
The problem with this "implicit estimating" is that - at least in quite a 
few cases in the Latin American steel industry - the "implicitly" chosen strategy 
has clearly not been the economically correct one. In Argentina, for example, we 
have come across not just the Acindar, Rosario case where the "implicit" choice 
has clearly been far from optimal, but also the very notable case of SOMISA, the 
Argentine state steel company where there is evidence that the exactly opposite 
error was made, of continually "jumping to new technology" in advance of the 
enterprise's true capabilities for absorbing and getting the technology to work 
properly. 
There would therefore seem to be a strong argument for researching into 
more case-histories of the evolution of Latin American steel firms to see (a) 
whether firms have tended to systematically underestimate or overestimate the 
three parameters related to old versus new technology mentioned above, and (b) to 
see how plants have been evolved in response to official steel policies and the 
various significant "imperfections" embodied in either these policies or in the 
surrounding economic context. 30 / 
Independently of further research, however, the Rosario case-study does by 
itself suggest two simple conclusions: first of all, the private firm faced by 
the problem of "trying to innovate in the midst of organized chaos" can profit 
considerably from the example shown by Acindar in its Rosario plant - which 
suggests that whatever the degree of "imperfection" or "perfection" of the 
surrounding context, it will help the firm very much to have creative engineers on 
its staff ready at short notice to either compensate the firm for the former or 
take full advantage of the latter. 
Secondly, from the social point of view, given that a society has limited 
supplies of skilled engineers, it make obvious sense to try to avoid that they 
waste their talents on minor problems. Acindar's Rosario engineers could have 
been working on blast furnace or direct reduction or oxygen-converter technology 
since more than a decade ago - but found themselves having to make minor ingenious 
improvements in a technology that should by then have been obsolete. This was 
economically much better for Acindar and for Argentina's balance of payments than 
it would have been if they had not made these improvements. But why, as our 
Argentine nuclear engineer has remarked, "make use of a catapult to kill 
mosquitoes", when much bigger targets are in view? 
10 to 12 further case studies of the evolution of different Latin 
American steelplants are now beginning under the auspices of the IDB-ECLA Regional 
Programme on Science and Technology, covering plants in Brasil, Mexico, Peru, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. 
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